Refugee crises worldwide, such as the Syrian refugee crisis, have exposed deep tensions in the governance of migration, especially in Europe. In 2015, nearly 1 million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe fleeing conflicts and persecution in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the instability in countries like Libya. Since then, the European Union (EU) has struggled to balance solidarity, rights and border control. As a response to this turning point, the EU has adopted new externalisation policies to manage the surge in migration, while at the same time fulfilling its international responsibility, maintaining its reputation as a promoter of democratic values and rights. Among these, the EU-Jordan Compact adopted in 2016 stands out as a flagship initiative, which was also adopted in Lebanon; the EU-Lebanon Compact, aiming to support Syrian refugees in those countries, as well as their host countries, while fostering regional stability. However, a closer analysis reveals how policies presented as resilience-building mechanisms serve the purpose of migration containment, raising serious concerns about the right to asylum and refugees’ international protection. This article argues that despite its humanitarian-development focus, the EU-Jordan Compact exemplifies a shift towards externalised migration control, undermining refugee agency and long-term protection outcomes.

The concept of resilience has gained prominence in development and humanitarian discourse, often framed as the capacity to "bounce back" from adversity or adapt after crises, whether by individuals, households, communities, or even a regions, without compromising long-term development. Within EU policy frameworks, resilience is promoted as both a protective mechanism and a pathway to self-reliance for crisis-affected populations. It is characterised by (i) collaboration between humanitarian and development actors along the so-called "resilience & humanitarian-development-peace nexus," (ii) the responsibility of crisis-affected states, and (iii) the framing of refugees as an economic development opportunity for refugee-hosting states. The 2016 EU Global Strategy emphasised resilience as a priority of foreign and security policy, advocating local capacity-building and self-reliance as alternatives to long-term aid dependency. Yet, this institutional perspective—while normatively appealing—tends to be detached from refugee agency, as it overlooks the socio-political roots and the systemic challenges refugees face, particularly when these policies are implemented in countries like Jordan, which is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and relies instead on a memorandum of understanding with UNHCR.

The 2016 EU-Jordan Compact illustrates this double-edged logic. While it granted financial assistance and relaxed trade regulations to Jordan in exchange for refugee access to jobs and education, it primarily functioned as a containment mechanism. This form of “remote control” allows the EU to limit asylum claims within its borders by supporting refugee-hosting countries to absorb and retain displaced populations. Jordan agreed to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees and integrate them into certain sectors, while the EU relaxed trade rules and unlocked development aid. While it has proved to be a “game changer” for refugee responses all over the world, it masks deeper structural exclusions and restrictions on refugee mobility.

This is also seen in the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which reinforces externalisation by strengthening cooperation with third countries to aid, trade or visa policies, and by expanding the use of “safe third country” designations for returns. Experts warn that such strategies may risk turning asylum into an outsourced responsibility, with insufficient guarantees for protection in host or transit countries.

From a legal rights perspective, the compact model and the Pact’s external dimension present substantial challenges. They reorient the right to asylum from an individualised legal protection to a geographically outsourced responsibility. Refugees, in effect, usually seek asylum from those neighbouring countries, not by choice but due to impermeable EU borders and the shrinking availability of third-country resettlement. As a result, this transforms asylum from a matter of rights into one of control and security, contradicting the EU’s image as a promoter of democratic values and human rights. Moreover, outsourcing responsibilities creates accountability gaps, as the EU cannot effectively monitor rights protection in partner countries with weaker protecting asylum systems.

Furthermore, the socio-economic data from Jordan suggests that resilience remains elusive for most Syrian refugees. Despite policy commitments, only about 27.2% of working-age refugees are employed. Many continue to rely heavily on humanitarian assistance, which due to the emergent decrease of humanitarian funding, over 80% live below the poverty line. The Compact’s employment schemes are limited to low-skill sectors, with high barriers to formalisation, particularly for women, as only 10% of these permits have been issued to women, revealing the intersectional barriers of gender, poverty, and displacement. This is compounded by the high cost of social security contributions and the informal nature of most labour opportunities. This raises concerns about the EU promoting an economic model of resilience while neglecting the structural inequities that perpetuate refugee vulnerability, creating what some experts call a “containment-development nexus”.

Moreover, the resilience narrative, though central to the EU’s strategy, fails to engage refugee perspectives meaningfully. For example, during the development of the Jordan Compact, Syrian refugees were not consulted. This exclusion explains why outcomes have fallen short of expectations: many refugees experience the Compact as a form of conditional aid rather than sustained empowerment. Instead of building resilience, these policies have continued to produce dependency and frustrations for a dignified future. Similar critiques are found in the Pact, which emphasises returns but underplays legal pathways and refugee agency.

The EU’s externalisation strategy in Jordan thus exemplifies a broader “containment-development nexus” where development aid becomes instrumentalised for migration control, undermining the core principles of international protection, especially the right to seek asylum in a safe country of choice. The strategy also reflects an unequal distribution of responsibility, placing additional pressure on host countries, in this case Jordan, while EU member states reduce their own legal obligations, as the Government of Jordan has repeatedly emphasised, including at the 8th Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region in 2024.

To realign policy with rights-based frameworks, the EU must embed human rights guarantees into all compacts and ensure that funding mechanisms prioritise protection over containment. Refugees should be recognised as rights holders, with their rights respected and prioritised at all times. EU member states must increase resettlement commitments and expand legal asylum pathways, rather than offloading responsibility to countries with limited capacity. Moreover, refugee participation must be institutionalised as a core element of legitimacy and accountability, ensuring meaningful response to refugees’ needs and aspirations.

In conclusion, while the EU-Jordan Compact and associated resilience frameworks have opened some avenues for refugee inclusion, they ultimately fall short in addressing the root causes of vulnerability. Together with the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, they represent a sophisticated form of externalised governance that instrumentalises aid to serve EU border priorities. To uphold the right to asylum and promote refugee resilience, policies must be co-designed with refugees, grounded in standards of protection, and motivated by solidarity.